Block insecure Kubernetes manifests with a security SKILL.md

Write SKILL.md for reviewing Kubernetes manifests, Helm values, and kustomize overlays before merge. The agent produces merge-blocking security findings, not generic hardening tips.

Repository context:
[paths to manifests: k8s/, helm/, kustomize/, or .yaml in deploy/]
[cluster policy: PSS standard/baseline, allowed service types, namespaces requiring NetworkPolicy]
[secret management: sealed-secrets, external-secrets, vault — never plaintext secrets in manifests]
[resource quota enforcement: whether limits are required on all workloads]

Diff context (paste when using):
[PR diff or file list changed]

SKILL.md must include:
1. Purpose — catch dangerous pod/workload configs before they reach production clusters where privilege escalation or lateral movement is possible.
2. When to use — any PR touching *.yaml in deploy paths, Helm charts, or kustomize; when not to use — README-only or docs.
3. Severity rubric the agent must use in findings:
   - Block: privileged: true or allowPrivilegeEscalation, hostPath or hostNetwork without documented exception, secrets in env: (not envFrom secretRef), capabilities: [SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN] without waiver, runAsUser: 0 in prod namespace, public LoadBalancer exposing internal service.
   - Warn: missing resource limits/requests on workloads, no NetworkPolicy in prod namespace, readOnlyRootFilesystem: false, no securityContext at all, ambient credentials mounted (serviceAccountToken) without explicit use.
   - Note: deprecated apiVersions, replicas < 2 for prod, missing liveness/readiness probes, antiAffinity not set.
4. Required inputs: file list, target namespace/cluster (dev vs prod), link to cluster policy doc if available.
5. Review steps:
   - Read each workload spec (Deployment, StatefulSet, DaemonSet, Pod, Job, CronJob) for securityContext at pod and container level.
   - Flag any privileged: true, hostPath, hostNetwork, hostPID, or hostIPC — demand waiver ticket for each.
   - Check capabilities: must drop ALL and only add specific caps with justification; block any SYS_* or NET_RAW without named exception.
   - Scan for secrets in env: — must use envFrom: secretKeyRef or volume mounts; flag plaintext base64 values.
   - Verify resource limits: memory/cpu limits on all containers; note if missing for prod workloads.
   - Check NetworkPolicy exists for namespace; if prod and missing, warn egress/ingress is wide open.
   - List findings as: [Block|Warn|Note] file:line — resource.kind/name — issue — suggested fix (one line).
6. PR comment template: Summary counts by severity, Findings table with resource context, Merge recommendation (block / approve with warnings / approve).
7. Two example prompts: new Deployment yaml vs Helm values granting hostPath to logging sidecar.
8. Pitfalls: approving privileged init containers that still enable breakout, missing resource type like CronJob, allowing capabilities: [NET_BIND_SERVICE] without checking what port it binds, waiving blocks without ticket or review date, ignoring kustomize overlays that override secure base.
9. Done means: every Block resolved or waived with ticket in PR, Warns acknowledged, no secret values printed in comment, deprecated APIs noted for future migration.

Rules:
- Never print real secret values from manifests; redact to [REDACTED].
- Do not recommend PodSecurityPolicy — it was removed in k8s 1.25; use Pod Security Standards.
- Output only SKILL.md markdown.